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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Nienburg pled guilty to felony Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter, DUI) 
with a persistent violator enhancement. As part of that plea agreement, Mr. Nienburg 
agreed to pay restitution. The State submitted its restitution request, but Mr. Nienburg's 
attorney argued at the sentencing hearing that some of the damages included, 
specifically the damage to the police cruiser, could not properly be claimed as restitution 
under the statute. The court rejected that argument and ordered Mr. Nienburg to pay 
restitution in the amount requested by the State. 
The District Court also sentenced Mr. Nienburg to a unified sentence of fifteen 
years, with four years fixed, although Mr. Nienburg had not received a DUI in the past 
eight years. It is from these orders that Mr. Nienburg appeals. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Despite a lengthy criminal record, Mr. Nienburg has attempted to change. 
Indicative of that desire, he entered a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to 
felony DUI with a persistent violator enhancement, and in exchange, the State would 
drop two pending misdemeanor charges. (Tr., p.6, LS.6-10 (citing R., p.29.)) Also 
included in his plea agreement was an agreement that he pay restitution that "will not 
exceed $1,156.98." (Tr., p.6, Ls.17-18.) 
Regarding restitution, defense counsel contended that the amount claimed by 
the State was not properly "restitution" under the statutory definition. (See 
Tr., pp.18-24.) The damages claimed were to a police cruiser that responded to the 
scene. (Presentence Report Investigation (hereinafter, PSI), p.79.) Mr. Nienburg's dog 
was in the back of his car. (PSI, p.79.) Apparently, the dog was spooked by the lights 
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and sounds of the various responding police vehicles. (PSI, p.79.) It jumped out of the 
car and tried to run away when it collided with one of the police cruisers. (PSI, p.79.) 
The dog was killed and the cruiser was damaged. (PSI, p.79.) Mr. Nienburg argued 
that the damage to the police cruiser was not the result of his criminal conduct and so 
could not be claimed as restitution. (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-17.) The court rejected his 
contention, holding that Mr. Nienburg had agreed to pay all $1,156.98 as part of the 
plea agreement. 1 (Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.1.) 
While this was Mr. Nienburg's eighth lifetime DUI, it has also been approximately 
eight years since his last DUI. (PSI, p.8-11.) He recognized that his choices were poor 
and that he would have to suffer the consequences for those decisions. (Tr., p.32, 
Ls.14-25.) His version of events was that he had been drinking when his wife suffered a 
medical emergency, and, in that emotional moment, his reason was overcome and he 
tried to follow the ambulance to the hospital, realized what he was doing, and turned 
around to go home.2 (Tr., p.30, Ls.15-25; p.31, Ls.21-25.) At the sentencing hearing, 
he expressed his sincere remorse for his poor decision-making. (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-10.) 
Based on all the mitigation presented, Mr. Nienburg requested that the court 
impose a fifteen-year sentence with two years fixed. (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-18.) The 
prosecutor, relying mostly on Mr. Nienburg's criminal history, requested a fifteen-year 
sentence, four years fixed, pursuant to the plea agreement. (Tr., pp.26-29.) 
1 This includes the amount for the damage caused to the police cruiser by 
Mr. Nienburg's dog, valued at an estimated $1,088.98. (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24.) The 
remaining $68.00 was for expenses incurred by the Boise City Police Department. 
(R., p.68.) 
2 The court did not find any evidence to corroborate this version of events. (Tr., p.37, 
Ls.22-24.) 
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The court engaged in a thorough examination of Mr. Nienburg's criminal record 
before imposing his sentence. (Tr., pp.37 -46.) Proclaiming its sentence to be lenient 
and discretionary, it imposed a fifteen-year sentence with four years fixed, a $1,156.98 
order for restitution, and a $1,520.50 order for fines and costs. (R., p.70, Ls.18-23.) 
Mr. Nienburg timely appealed from that order. (R., p.76) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court exceed its statutory authority when it ordered Mr. Nienburg 
to pay for the damage to the police cruiser, which was not the result of his 
criminal conduct? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Nienburg following his plea of guilty 




The District Court Exceeded Its Statutory Authority When It Ordered Mr. Nienburg To 
Pay For The Damage To The Police Cruiser, Which Was Not The Result Of His 
Criminal Conduct 
A. Introduction 
Raymond Nienburg appeals from the District Court's order imposing restitution in 
the amount of $1,088.98 upon him after entering a plea of guilty to felony DUI with a 
Persistent Violator enhancement. Mr. Nienburg asserts that the damages claimed were 
not caused by his criminal conduct, and so could not properly be claimed as restitution. 
He also asserts that District Court erred in concluding that he "agreed" to pay all the 
restitution. Therefore, he claims that the District Court was without statutory authority to 
impose restitution for the damage to the police cruiser. 
B. There Is No Statutory Authority To Order Restitution Damages For The Damage 
To The Police Cruiser 
Restitution under the Idaho Code permits the court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to 
the victim." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(2) (2011). A "victim" is "a person or entity, who 
suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct.,,3 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(1) (e) (i) (2011) (emphasis added). "Criminal conduct" is 
limited only to those actions for which the defendant is found guilty. State v. Shafer, 
144 Idaho 370, 373 (Ct.App. 2007). In some cases in this area, the term "culpable act" 
is substituted for "criminal conduct." See e.g. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 
3 There are other definitions of "victim" under this section which are inapplicable to this 
case. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(1) (e) (2011). 
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374 (2007). A defendant may be ordered to pay additional restitution if he agrees to 
pay such restitution as part of a plea deal. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373 (citing IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-5304(9». A determination of restitution by the trial court is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct.App. 2002). 
To order restitution without an agreement by the parties, a court must have 
statutory authority permitting the order.4 Id. Idaho statutes limit the court's authority in 
this respect to only the damages caused by the conduct for which the defendant has 
been convicted. Id. at 38 (citing Hughey v. U.S., 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990); see also 
Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372; State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886-87 (Ct.App. 2008); 
State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct.App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct.App. 1995). Therefore, damages caused by 
actions unrelated to the crime for which the defendant is found guilty cannot be claimed 
as restitution because the person suffering the loss is not a "victim" under the statute. 
See Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(1) (e». 
To determine whether someone is a "victim" in this regard, Idaho employs the tort 
law causation analysis. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374. Causation has two parts: actual 
cause and proximate cause. State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). Actual cause 
is determined using the "but for" test. Id. On the other hand, proximate cause is 
determined by using the "reasonably foreseeable" test. Id. The reasonably foreseeable 
test requires the court to determine "whether the injury and manner of occurrence are 
'so highly unusual ... that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities 
of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expect the injury 
4 Mr. Nienburg asserts that the parties did not reach an agreement regarding restitution. 
That particular argument will be addressed in Section C. 
6 
to occur.'" Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374 (quoting Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 
875 (2009)). When the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly unusual that they 
are not reasonably foreseeable, they constitute an intervening, superseding cause. 
An intervening, superseding cause is "an independent act or force that breaks the 
causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the victim's injury." Id. 
(emphasis added). It replaces the defendant's act as the proximate cause and relieves 
him of liability, so long as the intervening, superseding cause is unforeseeable and 
extraordinary. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. 
1. Mr. Nienburg's Culpable Action Was Not The Actual Cause Of The 
Damage To The Police Cruiser 
Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) did not cause the dog to exit his car, which 
caused the damages claimed. Contrast with Corbus, 150 Idaho at 603 (where the 
passenger in a vehicle may have acted of his own volition, but did so because 
Mr. Corbus was driving recklessly trying to evade police and for that reason, 
Mr. Corbus' culpable act (reckless driving) was deemed to be the actual cause of his 
passenger's injuries). 
The court misapplied the "but for" test when considering the defense's argument 
on this point, holding that, "It wouldn't have happened but for your client running from 
the scene and leaving the door open and having been driving under the influence." 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.18-21.) The only properly considered act in this case is Mr. Nienburg's 
culpable act (DUI). See e.g. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372. Considering the other cause 
(leaving the door open and running from the scene) is improper and an abuse of 
discretion because he was not found guilty of a crime based on those actions. See id. 
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The culpable act (DUI) cannot be the actual cause because, as the court noted, 
Mr. Nienburg had to engage in the other action (exiting his vehicle and leave the door 
open) for the dog to get out and be in a position to damage the cruiser. If the dog had 
been inside his car, it could not have damaged the cruiser. The DUI only got the dog to 
the scene. It did not, however, put him in the position to damage the cruiser. The 
actual cause, the action that put the dog to be in the position to cause the damage was 
leaving the door open. Since that is not the culpable act, Mr. Nienburg cannot be 
considered to be the actual cause. 5 
Because Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) was not the actual cause of the 
damage, imposing this restitution without an agreement between parties constitutes an 
abuse of discretion and this Court should vacate the restitution order or strike the 
portion of the restitution order relating to the damages to the police cruiser, or, 
alternatively, remand this case for a new restitution hearing with instructions that the 
District Court may not assess restitution for the damage to the police cruiser. 
2. Mr. Nienburg's Culpable Act Was Not The Proximate Cause Of The 
Damage To The Police Cruiser 
Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) was not the proximate cause because in 
manner of occurrence as it was neither foreseeable to the reasonable person nor in a 
chain of events uninterrupted by an intervening, superseding cause. 
The manner of occurrence of the injury in this case was not reasonably 
foreseeable, and therefore, Mr. Nienburg's culpable action cannot be deemed to be the 
5 While it is true that Mr. Nienburg took the dog to this particular location, the proper 
analysis focuses on his culpable act. If his DUI caused the dog to be in the position to 
damage the cruiser, it might be deemed to be the actual cause. However, the State 
offered no evidence to show that fact. See State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114-15 
(CLApp. 2008) (citing State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 283 (Ct.App. 2008». 
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proximate cause. See Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374. Consistent with the test articulated 
in both Lampien and Cramer, a reasonable person making an inventory of potential 
reasons for a police cruiser to be damaged due to a DUI would not include this 
particular manner of occurrence. Rather, a reasonable person would include a collision 
between the defendant's car and the police cruiser as a potential cause for damage to 
the cruiser. It might also be foreseeable for the defendant to run the officer off the road 
or for the defendant to kick or head butt the car and so cause damage to the cruiser. 
It is not foreseeable that a dog would get out the vehicle, react wildly to the lights and 
sirens, and run into the cruiser. Rather, the dog's reaction constitutes an intervening, 
superseding cause. See Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. That is an extraordinary and 
unforeseeable response by the dog and it breaks the causal chain between 
Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) and the damage to the cruiser. Therefore, 
Mr. Nienburg's culpable action (DUI) cannot be deemed to be the proximate cause and 
he is relieved of liability for the damage. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; Cramer, 146 Idaho 
at 875. 
Since Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) was neither the actual nor the proximate 
cause of the damage to the police cruiser, the State does not qualify as a victim under 
the restitution statute. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(1) (e). Therefore, there is no 
statutory authority supporting the court's restitution order. 
C. Mr. Nienburg And The State Did Not Reach An Agreement On The Total For 
Restitution, And So That Cannot Be The Basis To Order Him To Pay For The 
Damage To The Police Cruiser 
Plea agreements are like contracts and are analyzed under contract standards. 
State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11 (Ct.App. 2003). The District Court held that 
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Mr. Nienburg agreed to pay all the restitution claimed by the state in this case. 
(Tr., p.19, L.4-7.) Therefore, as part of the plea agreement, his agreement to pay 
restitution is also subject to contract standards. 
First, it is critically important to understand the terms of the agreement. Since 
there is no written copy of the agreement for the record, this Court must rely on the 
District Court's oral recitation of the terms of the deal found in the transcript. 
(See Tr., p.6, Ls.5-21.) The critical part of the agreement was recorded as follows: 
"Restitution will not exceed $1,156.98." (Tr., p.6, Ls.17-18.) (emphasis added). When 
asked by the court, the defendant affirmed that to be the agreement and neither 
attorney objected to that formulation of the agreement. (See Tr., p.6, L.22.) After 
questioning Mr. Nienburg, the court decided to accept both pleas and set the case for 
sentencing. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13.) Therefore, under contract standards, all parties agreed 
to those terms and the agreement became enforceable pursuant to those terms. 
The word "exceed" is the critical term and reveals why there is no agreement as 
to the amount of restitution. The parties in this case, as indicated by defense counsel's 
challenge to the ultimate amount claimed, must have intended the phrase "will not 
exceed" to mean that they agreed to the maximum amount that could potentially be 
included in the restitution order. In fact, the court noted at the sentencing hearing that 
"he [Mr. Nienburg] was free to argue for less." (Tr., p.18, Ls.5-6.) Both attorneys 
acknowledged that interpretation was within their understanding of their agreement. 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.11-12.) That interpretation also indicates that they did not have a meeting 
of the minds on the actual total that would be included in the restitution order. 
Therefore, at best for the State, the phrase "will not exceed" is ambiguous and open to 
multiple meanings. See e.g. U.S. v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (as an 
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example of an ambiguity in a plea agreement specifically over the inclusion and amount 
of restitution). 
Ambiguities in these agreements are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595 (2010); see also Hughey, 495 U.S. at 422 
(applying this rule specifically to a restitution issue). Ambiguity may arise even from the 
statement that the defendant will pay for the "entire loss" suffered by the victim. 
See Aubert, 119 Idaho at 871. Although the court did not specifically discuss that issue, 
the term "entire loss" is ambiguous because the parties can dispute which damages are 
properly included in the "entire loss." See e.g. State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 943 
(Ct.App. 1997) (limiting restitution to only those damages the state was able to 
prove); but see e.g. U.S. v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
agreement specifying the exact amount of restitution that would be owing pursuant to 
the agreement was unambiguous). This is because "the restitution statute is not so 
broad, however, as to authorize compensation for every expenditure that a victim may 
personally deem reasonable or necessary as a response to a crime." Card, 146 Idaho 
at 114 (emphasis in original). "Nor does it authorize restitution for every out-of-pocket 
expenditure suffered but for the defendant's crime." Gonzales, 144 Idaho at 776. 
In that regard, "the State bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing ... that 
the expenses were reasonable and necessary to treat injuries caused by the 
defendant's criminal conduct." Card, 146 Idaho at 114-15 (citing Doe, 146 Idaho 
at 283); see also State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687,692 (Ct.App. 2007). 
In this case, the State has failed to make its prima facie showing that 
Mr. Nienburg's criminal conduct (his culpable act of DUI) caused the damage for which 
it is seeking restitution. Even if the court determined that the State had made its 
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showing, Mr. Nienburg had not agreed that the damage to the cruiser should be 
included, only that it might be included. Therefore, the agreement that the restitution 
"will not exceed" the identified total either indicates that there is no agreement or, at 
best, the term is ambiguous. If there is no agreement, those damages cannot be 
recovered in restitution. If the term is ambiguous, it must be read in favor of the 
defendant. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 422. As a result, the agreement must be read to 
understand that the amount identified (including the damage to the cruiser) was the 
amount that might be included in a restitution order, but that there was no agreement 
that the damage to the cruiser should be included. Because there was no agreement 
by the parties, the restitution order cannot be based on § 19-5304(9). 
There is also a sound policy reason to take this perspective. If the State is 
allowed to ask for any damages in restitution without question after the defendant 
pleads guilty, then there is nothing to stop the State from agreeing to claim "any and all 
restitution" and then requesting excessive restitution. As this Court has noted, such a 
request for restitution can result in an injustice to the defendant. Shafer, 144 Idaho 
at 373. The defendant must have a chance to challenge the reasonability of the 
restitution claims, or else the statute is meaningless in its restrictions. Many of these 
damages are more properly recovered in the civil arena. In fact, the statute provides for 
that alternative by establishing that a recovery of restitution does not prevent civil 
recovery. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(11). For that and other reasons, the statute limits 
restitution claims. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(1); see also Card, 146 Idaho 
at 114; Gonzales, 144 Idaho at 776. Therefore, even though Mr. Nienburg agreed to 
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pay restitution, he must be allowed to review the damages claimed and object to those 
he believes inappropriate, or else the statute is meaningless.6 
Since there was no agreement under §19-5304(9) and since the State does not 
qualify as a victim under §5304(1)(e), the order for restitution was improper and 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See e.g. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373. Therefore, this 
Court should vacate the restitution order or strike the portion relating to the damage to 
the police cruiser, or, alternatively, remand this case for a new restitution hearing with 
instructions that the District Court may not assess restitution for the damage to the 
police cruiser. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Nienburg, Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Driving Under The Influence And Persistent Violator 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Nienburg appeals from the District Court's order imposing a fifteen year 
sentence, with four years fixed, after he pled guilty to felony DUI with a persistent 
violator enhancement. He alleges that the sentence was excessively harsh, that the 
court did not sufficiently consider all four sentencing objectives, and that it did not 
sufficiently consider the mitigating circumstances. 
6 Mr. Nienburg concedes that if the parties had agreed to a specific amount of restitution 
for identified damages that he could be deemed to have waived his right to challenge a 
corresponding restitution order. See e.g. Pappas, 409 F.3d at 830. However, in this 
case, there was no specific amount set by the parties - only a cap to what might be 
claimed - and therefore, he retains his right to object to the restitution order. 
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B. By Failing To Sufficiently Consider All The Sentencing Objectives and Mitigating 
Circumstances, The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence. 
Mr. Nienburg asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with four years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. 
See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct.App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Nienburg does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Nienburg must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives, of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility 
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001 )). The protection of society is the primary 
objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). 
Ergo, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will 
be considered reasonable. Id.; see also State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 
(Ct.App. 1982). 
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In issuing Mr. Nienburg's sentence, the court focused on only two of the 
sentencing objectives: protection of society and punishment. (Tr., p.39, Ls.19-21, pA7, 
Ls.1-24.) While it is correct that protection of society is the primary goal of sentencing, 
the court must still consider all the sentencing objectives when crafting a sentence. 
Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500 (citing State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956)). This 
is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and 
therefore, each must be addressed in sentencing. Id.; see also Too h ill, 103 Idaho 
at 568. 
There are several mitigating factors that a court should consider to determine 
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a reduced sentence in several cases. See e.g. Cook v. 
State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct.App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct.App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct.App. 1988), rev'd on other 
grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990); and State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982). In this 
case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the 
court as it crafted Mr. Nienburg's sentence. 
While Mr. Nienburg has been a habitual offender, his situation in this instance is 
uniquely different. The first important fact in that regard is it has been eight years since 
Mr. Nienburg's last DUI. (PSI, pp. 8-11.) This fact alone indicates that there has been a 
significant change in his ability to control himself because, as the court noted in detail, 
Mr. Nienburg has not been sober during that eight year period. (Tr., p.44, Ls.1-25.) 
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In particular, this fact indicates that he has made an effort to not drive when he has 
been drinking, and had been fairly successful at that. According to him, emotion 
overcame reason on this particular occasion because his wife had a health emergency.? 
Regardless, his rehabilitation has been making progress. To that end, he has been 
building a support network to help him deal with his problems. He received three letters 
of support from Nancy Wilson, Nikki Collins, and the Ortiz family. (PSI, pp.23-27.) He 
also received a support commitment from eight individuals who are willing to help him in 
his rehabilitative efforts. (PSI, p.28.) These facts all show his openness to rehabilitation 
as well as potential for success at it. 
They also show his amenability to treatment, which is another factor that must be 
sufficiently considered by the court. See e.g. Cook, 145 Idaho 489-90. In addition, he 
has tried to do what he can to continue getting treatment. Important in that regard is the 
fact that he recognizes that he needs it. (See Tr., p.34, Ls.10-11.) He has petitioned the 
court for financial aid to continue getting treatment, being that he is indigent, but the 
court refused to offer such assistance. (See e.g. R., p.48.) Undeterred, he managed to 
collect enough himself to pay for the SAP program himself. (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-17.) He is 
also willing to participate in more treatment programs, such as ABC, if he can get some 
financial help. (Tr., p.34, LS.24-25 - p.35, Ls.1-3.) The structured environments some 
of these programs offer also seem to be effective in treating Mr. Nienburg. (Tr., p.33, 
Ls.1-3.) Notably, while in prison, he has earned a certain level of trust with the staff, 
which has led to additional privileges, and there is no evidence that he has abused 
those privileges. (Tr., p.35, Ls.23-25 - p.36, Ls.1-13.) 
? The court did not find any support for that version of events, but that is his explanation 
for his actions. (Tr., p.37, Ls.22-24.) 
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Another factor the court insufficiently considered was that he showed sincere 
remorse for what he did. (Tr., p.37, LsA-10.) In addition, he accepted responsibility 
and pled guilty to a felony with a sentencing enhancement (felony DUI and Persistent 
Violator) in exchange for the State dismissing two misdemeanors. (Tr., p.6, LS.6-10 
(citing R, p.29.» 
There is no indication in the record that the court gave any consideration to these 
factors at all. Instead, it focused on his criminal record. Ultimately, the court concluded 
that it would issue a sentence that punished Mr. Nienburg, subjecting him to "four years 
of actual sobriety and perhaps at that point, you'll take it seriously. But it's time that you 
pay the price." (Tr., pA7, Ls.21-24.) This sentence provides negligible deterrence, 
specifically to Mr. Nienburg himself, which is another of the sentencing objectives. 
After this sentence, there is nothing else the system can impose on him except for a 
life sentence. As it is, he is forty-nine years old. (See PSI, p.5.) After he completes this 
entire sentence, he will be sixty-four. This means that a life sentence may only be 
equivalent to or only a few years longer than this current sentence. Therefore, there is 
little deterrent value to this sentence since it is just about all the system can bring to 
bear. In that same vein, there is no carrot to induce favorable behavior in this sentence, 
no reason for him to try and conform his actions to the legal precepts. This creates a 
dangerous situation for society, since deterrence is one mechanism by which the 
system attempts to decrease recidivism rates. If he has no reason to conform his 
actions, he is not deterred from continuing with his current habits by anything other 
than his own conscience. And, as the court noted, "drunk drivers kill more people 
than people who assault people. They are extremely dangerous to our community." 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.19-21.) 
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Furthermore, this sentence gives little to no consideration to rehabilitative 
opportunities. According to the presentence investigator, rehabilitation should have 
been considered. The investigator concluded that, "[aJlthough I believe that 
Mr. Nienburg would like to attempt to remain alcohol-free in the future, I do not believe 
that he has the tools to do so at this time." (PSI, p.19.) The implication from that 
statement is that Mr. Nienburg would be capable of remaining alcohol-free if he were 
given the appropriate training and counseling to help him do so. Therefore, 
rehabilitative options should have been considered in this sentence. Again, by failing to 
sufficiently consider this objective, this sentence creates a dangerous situation for 
society upon his eventual release. His problem, according to the investigator, is not 
desire, but control. (See PSI, p.19.) Mr. Nienburg corroborates that perspective. (See 
Tr., p.30, Ls.2-25) Since this sentence is not a life term, he will be released at some 
point. By not providing rehabilitative opportunities in his sentence, there is no attempt to 
provide him with those tools, and so when he is released, he will be similarly unable to 
control himself, should an emotional situation arise.8 This means that, despite his best 
efforts, he will likely be drinking and driving again, which is a danger to society. 
Therefore, the failure to sufficiently consider rehabilitation in the sentence puts society 
at more risk in the long run. 
Because the court did not sufficiently consider several mitigating factors 
Mr. Nienburg presented at the sentencing hearing, it insufficiently considered the 
sentencing objectives. Instead, the court tried to protect society by focusing on 
punishment, but in doing so, did not consider deterrence and rehabilitation when 
8 The only attempt at rehabilitation is a recommendation that he be given the 
opportunity to participate in the therapeutic community. However, just because it is 
recommended does not mean the recommendation will be followed. 
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crafting Mr. Nienburg's sentence. The outcome is an excessive sentence resulting from 
the abuse of discretion. Therefore, this Court should amend Mr. Nienburg's sentence 
as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nienburg respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution order. 
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the District Court for a new 
restitution hearing. 
Mr. Nienburg respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the District 
Court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 31 st day of October, 2011. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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